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generics instead of brand-names. First, we construct a theoretical model where phar-
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relative margins and relative patient copayments. Second, we exploit a unique product
level panel data set, which contains information on sales and prices at both producer
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1 Introduction
In the current paper we study the incentives for pharmacies to promote generic drugs
instead of brand-names. Physicians tend to prescribe higher priced brand-names rather
than the cheaper, but therapeutically equivalent, generic versions. In order to reduce
expenditures most insurers try to stimulate the sales of generic drugs. One important
mechanism in this regard is to allow or require pharmacies to suggest a generic substitute to
consumers that enter the pharmacy with a brand-name prescription. Generic substitution
regulation is often combined with copayment schemes, where consumers that refuse to
substitute will be charged a higher copayment. The generic sales are likely to depend not
only on the prices (copayments) of brand-name and generics, but also on the pharmacies
incentives to spend time and e¤ort convincing consumers to accept a generic version. But
why should pharmacies expend e¤ort on generic substitution? The obvious answer is the
protability of selling generics relative to brand-names. In this paper, we therefore study
the role of pharmacies in promoting generic sales by analysing the relationship between
the margins that pharmacies obtain for brand-names and generics and their respective
market shares.
We nd this issue interesting for the following reasons. First, pharmaceutical expen-
ditures are growing in most Western countries, and stimulating generic competition is
seen as one of the main instruments for regulators (payers) to contain costs in this eld.1
The o¤-patent market is becoming increasingly important as patents have expired (or will
expire in the near future) for several blockbusters.2 Second, many papers have adressed
various aspects around competition between brand-names and generics, but our paper is
the rst to look at the role of pharmacies and the e¤ect of generic substitution regula-
tions.3 Third, our study o¤ers insight into retailer incentives more broadly, as we study
1See, for instance, the reports by Pharma (2008) and EGA (2009). According to EGA (2009) about half
of the dispensed pharmaceuticals in the o¤-patent market segment in the European Union are generics,
but there are large variations across the member countries. In the US, however, the generic market share
(in volume) in this segment is about 90 percent. Thus, there should be great scope for regulatory policies
to a¤ect the generic sales and thus the pharmaceutical expenditures.
2See the report by EGA (2009).
3For example, Hellerstein (1998), Coscelli (2000) and Lundin (2002) study the role of physicians in
prescribing brand-names or generics; Grabowski and Vernon (1992) and Frank and Salkever (1997) study
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the promotional incentives for steering consumers towards more protable products. Sim-
ilar incentives are likely to be present in most downstream markets where the retailers sell
rival products (e.g., grocery stores, electronic stores, toy stores, car dealers, etc.).
In the rst part of the paper, we set up a vertical di¤erentiation model where brand-
names are perceived to be of higher quality than their generic versions. For consumers to
be willing to purchase generics, they need to be priced lower (have a lower copayment) than
the brand-names. Within this framework we introduce a (monopoly) pharmacy that may
expend e¤ort on persuading consumers to buy a generic version, for instance, by informing
them that the products are therapeutically equivalent. A pharmacy will expend e¤ort on
persuading patients to substitute only if the generic margin is higher than the brand-
name margin. Otherwise, the pharmacy will simply dispense the brand-name.4 Naturally,
the pharmacys substitution incentive is increasing the higher the generic margin becomes
relative to the brand-name margin, but the incentive is also increasing the lower the generic
copayment becomes relative to the brand-name copayment. The latter is due to the fact
that a larger copayment di¤erence makes it easier for the pharmacy to persuade consumers
to switch to a generic version.
We also study the role of pharmacy price setting, where we show that a marginal
reduction in, say, the brand-name price has two counteracting e¤ects on the substitution
e¤ort. On the one hand, the corresponding reduction in the brand-name margin increases
incentives for generic substitution. On the other hand, the corresponding lower price
di¤erence makes consumers more di¢ cult to persuade and therefore reduces the incentives
for substitution. We derive the prot-maximising brand-name and generic retail prices
under two di¤erent copayment schemes: coinsurance and reference pricing, where we show
that the latter reinforces the incentives for generic substitution and reduces brand-name
market shares.
the brand-name producers pricing incentives when generics enter the market. Aronsson et al. (2001),
Bergman and Rudholm (2003) and Brekke et al. (2009, 2010), study the impact of generic reference
pricing on brand-name pricing and market shares. We review the literature more carefully in the next
section.
4 In some countries or health plans, generic substitution is mandatory. However, patients can still refuse
to accept a generic version, which means that persuasion still plays a role also under mandatory generic
substitution.
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In the second part of the paper, we provide an empirical analysis of the pharmacies
substitution incentives by looking at the relationship between margins and market shares.
We use a unique product level panel dataset from the Prescription database of the Nor-
wegian Institute of Public Health. This database contains all prescription bound sales in
Norway at pharmacy level from 2004 and onwards. We have obtained detailed sales and
volume data at product level for 74 o¤-patent substances with generic competition for a
four year period (2004-7). We match these data with data from a second database, called
the Wholesale database (administrated by the same institute). These data contain infor-
mation about producer (ex-manufacturer) prices at product level. Thus, we have both the
producer price and the retail (pharmacy) price per product per wholesaler (or pharmacy).
Since more than 85 percent of the pharmacies are vertically integrated with (owned by)
the wholesalers, we observe the (gross) margin of the distributors.
From the descriptive statistics we observe that brand-names are priced higher than
generics and still have signicant market shares despite generics being therapeutically
equivalent (identical).5 We also observe that pharmacies have substantially higher mar-
gins on generics than brand-names measured either as percentage margins or absolute
margins. We then proceed by testing whether higher margins lead to higher market shares.
In estimating the e¤ect of margins on market shares we control for relative retail prices of
brand-names versus generics. This is important, because a higher, say, generic retail price
increases the generic margin, but at the same time also reduces the price (copayment)
di¤erence between brand-names and generics. Since these two e¤ects pull in opposite
directions, the e¤ect of margins on market shares will be underestimated if changes in rel-
ative retail prices are not taken into account. We also control for substance and wholesaler
xed e¤ects and use lagged variables as instruments to account for potential endogeneity
in the explanatory variables. Our empirical results show a strong and highly signicant
e¤ect of brand-name and generic margins on their market shares. Thus, pharmacies seem
to expend more e¤ort in promoting generics when their margins are high relative to the
5This is consistent with our theoretical analysis, as well as previous empirical literature (e.g., Grabowski
and Vernon, 1992, Frank and Salkever, 1997, Pavcnik, 2002, Brekke et al., 2009, 2010).
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brand-names.
Our results suggest that pharmacy incentives are important when it comes to stimulat-
ing generic sales. In terms of policy implications, our analysis highlights the importance of
taking pharmacy incentives, and in particular brand-name versus generic margins, into ac-
count when designing the optimal regulatory scheme for the pharmaceutical industry. For
example, regressive mark-up regulation at pharmacy level might be a powerful regulatory
instrument in order to promote generic sales. Furthermore, our results also suggest that
the positive e¤ect of reference pricing on generic sales is reinforced by pharmaciessubsti-
tution incentives. Thus, when taking pharmacy incentives into account, the cost-saving
e¤ect of generic reference pricing might be even higher than previously thought.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2 we relate our study to
previous literature. In section 3 we present a theoretical model of pharmacy incentives
and derive some key results regarding the relationship between margins and market shares
for brand-name versus generic drugs. In section 4 we describe the institutional background,
while our data and some descriptive statistics are presented in Section 5. A description
of our empirical method and a presentation and discussion of our main empirical results
are given in Section 6. In Section 7 we briey discuss some policy implications before the
paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Related literature
Several studies have examined the role of physicians in the prescription drug market.
Hellerstein (1998) looks at the importance of physicians in the choice between brand-
names and generics. Using US survey data on physicians, their patients and the drugs
prescribed, she nds that almost all physicians prescribe both types of drugs to their
patients. However, some physicians are more likely to prescribe brand-names, while others
are more likely to prescribe generics. She nds that very little of the prescription choice
can be explained by observable characteristics of individual patients. In particular, there is
no indication that patients who do not have insurance coverage for prescription drugs are
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more likely to have generic versions prescribed. The main conclusion is that the physician
is the important agent in the prescription decision, though the reason why some physicians
are more likely to prescribe generics or brand-names is largely left unexplained.6
Another paper in the same vein is Coscelli (2000), who studies the contribution of
physician and patient "habit" to the persistence in market shares of brand-names and
generics. Having Italian micro data on patients and physicians for prescriptions of anti-
ulcer drugs over a 3-year period, allows him to control for individual heterogeneity and to
explore time-dependence in drug choices. Estimating the probability of switching brands
as a function of patient and physician attributes, he nds evidence for habit persistence
for both physicians and patients. However, since prices are always the same for di¤erent
versions of therapeutically equivalent drugs by regulatory at in the Italian drug market,
there are no economic incentives for either physicians or patients to prefer one version over
the other.
Lundin (2000) examines whether the choice made by physicians concerning drugs ver-
sion (brand-name or generic) is subject to (ex post) moral hazard. Using prescription
microdata with explicit costs for both the patients and the third party payer in Sweden
over a 3 year period (for two pharmacies and seven substances), he nds that patient and
physician "habits" matter. However, he also nds that patients that face large copay-
ments are less (more) likely to receive a brand-name (generic) than patients that get most
of their costs reimbursed, which contrasts the ndings by Hellerstein (1998). This result
is interpreted as (ex post) moral hazard i.e., insurance leads to overconsumption and
suggests that physicians act more in the interest of the patient than the payer.
In the above-mentioned studies, and in most health care systems, physicians do not
have any nancial incentives to prescribe a brand-name or a generic. This is, however,
not always the case. Iizuka (2007) examines the physician-patient agency relationship
in the prescription drug market in Japan, where physicians often both prescribe and
6There are two notable shortcomings concerning the data. First, the data set has no price information,
which means that relative branded-generic prices are not observed. Second, the physicians surveyed were
asked to record information over a 2-week period only, which implies that patientspreferences (tastes)
cannot be accounted for.
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dispense drugs. Since the physicians can pocket the prots, the mark-up of drugs might
distort their prescription choices from more suitable drugs for a given patient towards
more protable drugs for the physician. Using product level data on anti-hypertensive
drugs, Iizuka (2007) nds evidence that prescription choices are inuenced by the mark-
up. However, physicians are also sensitive to patients out-of-pocket costs, and even more
so than the mark-ups, which is consistent with Lundin (2000). In contrast to the previous
studies, Iizuka (2007) looks at physicianschoices between (chemically) di¤erent brand-
names (anti-hypertensive drugs) and not on the choice between therapeutically equivalent
drugs. Moreover, he does not have direct information on the wholesale prices.
There is also a recent paper by Liu et al. (2009) that looks at the nancial incentives
for physicians to prescribe brand-names or generics in Taiwan. As in Japan, physicians
both prescribe and dispense drugs and can pocket the prots of doing so. Focusing on
diabetic patients, they examine whether physicians tend to prescribe (and dispense) prod-
ucts with higher margins. A major problem with their study is that they only observe the
reimbursement price and not the margins. They nd that a lower reimbursement price
leads to more generic sales, which is interpreted as physician rent seeking.
A second strand of literature focuses on the importance of regulation on generic sales.
A related paper is Aronsson et al. (2001) who study the impact of generic competition
(measured by relative branded-generic prices) on brand-name market shares. They nd
weak evidence that generic competition contributes to lower brand-name market shares.
They also nd that the introduction of reference pricing contributes to reducing brand-
name market shares. A more rigorous study on the importance of reference pricing is
Pavcnik (2002). She studies the introduction of (therapeutic) RP in Germany in 1989.
Using data for two di¤erent therapeutic elds (oral antidiabetics and antiulcerants) for
1986 to 1996, she identies signicant price reductions of the RP system for both brand-
names and generics, with the e¤ect being stronger for brand-names. Similar results are
obtained in Brekke, Grasdal and Holmås (2009) based on a Norwegian policy experiment.7
7Bergman and Rudholm (2003) study the e¤ects of the Swedish RP system on brand-name (not generic)
prices. Distinguishing between actual and potential generic competition, they nd that RP only reduced
prices of brand-names that faced actual generic competition.
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Moreover, Brekke, Holmås and Straume (2010) study the impact of regulation on generic
competition and pharmaceutical prices. They nd that reference pricing stimulates generic
competition resulting in lower brand-name market shares and prices compared with price
cap regulation. They also nd that reference pricing leads to lower pharmaceutical expen-
ditures. Thus, there seems to be a fairly robust empirical nding that reference pricing
reduces both brand-name and generic prices and increases generic market shares.
While the economics literature on the importance of the physicians and the regulation
system for brand-name and generic sales focusing on incentives for producers and con-
sumers is fairly large, our study is (to the best of our knowledge) a rst attempt to study
the role of pharmacies in promoting generics instead of brand-names. Our ndings sug-
gest that pharmacies do indeed play an important role in determining brand-name versus
generic sales, with corresponding important implications for the magnitude of pharmaceu-
tical expenditures.
Finally, we should also mention that our paper is related to a broader IO literature
on vertical relations. The idea that retailers can inuence consumerspurchase choices
among competing brands, and that their incentives to do so depend on relative margins,
goes back at least as far as Telser (1960), who argued that such incentives provide a
rationale for manufacturers to prefer contracts imposing retail price maintenance.8 This
is particularly relevant to the literature on common agency, where competing upstream
suppliers sell their products through the same retailer, as in the pharmaceutical industry.
A well known argument for common agency (as opposed to exclusive dealing) is that
such an arrangement facilitates collusion in the downstream market and is therefore in
the interest also of upstream suppliers (Bernheim and Whinston, 1985, 1986). On the
other hand, the retailers ability to steer demand towards more protable products can
induce more competition between suppliers and therefore create a rationale for exclusive
dealing.9 However, the question of common agency versus exclusive dealing is less of an
8A recent paper considering such "steering" by retailers is Raskovich (2007), who shows that competition
for steering by upstream suppliers can lead to double-marginalisation.
9 In the case of asymmteric information between suppliers and retailers, Gal-Or (1991) and Martimort
(1996) show that common agency could also lead to higher informational rents compared with exclusive
dealing.
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issue in our particular setting  generic competition in the pharmaceutical industry 
since exclusive dealing contracts between producers and distributors are generally strictly
regulated, in the sense each pharmacy is usually required to store and deliver the full range
of pharmaceuticals that are prescribed by physicians.
3 A theoretical model of pharmacy incentives
There is a total mass of 1 consumers, each with a prescription for the same brand-name
drug that is dispensed by a pharmacy. There is also a generic copy-drug available in case
the consumer wants to substitute. Consumers di¤er in their willingness-to-pay for drugs.
The net utility of drug consumption is given by
U =
8><>: v   cb if brand-namev   cg if generic ; (1)
where v is uniformly distributed on [v; v]. The parameter  2 (0; 1) represents the quality
degradation that consumers attribute to the generic version of the drug, while cb and cg
are the copayments of the brand-name and generic drug, respectively. Assuming that v is
large enough to make the market fully covered (i.e., total demand is inelastic and equal
to 1), the demand for the two drug versions are given by Dg =
bv v
v v and Db =
v bv
v v , where
bv =
8>>>><>>>>:
v if cb   cg  1  
cb cg
1  if cb   cg 2 (0; 1  )
v if cb   cg  0
: (2)
Thus, consumers are willing to buy the generic drug only if it involves a lower copay-
ment. Otherwise, everybody purchases the brand-name drug. The demand sensitivity
with respect to copayments crucially depends on the perceived quality di¤erence: a lower
 implies less demand sensitivity.
The wholesale prices of the brand-name and generic drugs are, respectively, wb and
wg. Since pharmacies generally have a stronger bargaining position towards producers
9
of generics, it is reasonable to assume that wb > wg.10 Assume further that pharmacies
can expend e¤ort towards the individual consumer in persuading her to accept generic
substitution. More specically, assume that the perceived quality degradation of the
generic drug () depend on the e¤ort (e) exerted by the pharmacy:  (e), where 0 (e) > 0,
00 (e) < 0 and  (0) =  2 (0; 1). The e¤ort cost is given by C (e), where C 0 (e) > 0 and
C 00 (e)  0.
Denoting the retail prices of the brand-name and the generic drugs by pb and pg,
respectively, the prot of the pharmacy is given by
 = mbDb +mgDg   C (e) ; (3)
where mb := pb   wb and mg := pg   wg are the margins of the brand-name and generic
drug, respectively.
3.1 Pharmacy incentives for generic substitution
For given prices, the optimal choice of substitution e¤ort is implicitly given by11
@
@e
=
(mg  mb) (cb   cg) 0 (e)
(v   v) (1  )2   C
0 (e) = 0: (4)
A strictly positive substitution e¤ort requires that
1. the margin is higher for the generic than for the brand-name product, and
2. the brand-name copayment is larger than the generic copayment.
Otherwise, the pharmacy has no incentives to spend e¤ort on persuading consumers to
switch to the generic version. The optimal substitution e¤ort increases with the generic-
10 In the context of pharmacy incentives for generic substitution, the case of wb < wg, besides being less
realistic, is also less interesting, since this implies that pharmacies would have no incentives for generic
substitution as long as the retail price of generics is at or below the retail price of the brand-name drug
(which is the realistic price regime).
11The second-order condition is
@2
@e2
=
(mg  mb) (cb   cg)
(v   v)
"
00 (1  ) + 2 (0)2
(1  )3
#
  C00 < 0:
10
branded di¤erence in margins (mg   mb). This implies that the pharmacys substitu-
tion incentives are partly determined by the price setting of the brand-name and generic
producers. A lower (higher) wholesale price on brand-names (wb) will increase (reduce)
brand-name prot margins and lead to reduced (increased) substitution e¤ort. A similar
e¤ect applies to the wholesale price of the generic drug (wg).
More interesting is perhaps the e¤ect of the copayment system on substitution incen-
tives. From (4) we see that, for given margins, the optimal substitution e¤ort increases
with the branded-generic copayment di¤erence (cb   cg). Intuitively, the reason is that a
larger copayment di¤erence makes it easier to convince consumers to switch to the generic
drug. Furthermore, a larger copayment di¤erence will reinforce the positive relationship
between relative margins (mb  mg) and substitution e¤ort.
This result has clear-cut implications for the substitution e¤ects of di¤erent types of
copayment systems. Consider a simple coinsurance regime, where the copayment is dened
as
ci = pi + f; i = b; g; (5)
where  2 (0; 1) is the coinsurance rate and f is a deductible. With this copayment
scheme, the branded-generic copayment di¤erence is given by cb  cg =  (pb   pg). Thus,
the higher the coinsurance rate (), the higher is the optimal substitution e¤ort and the
stronger is the e¤ect of relative margins on substitution incentives.
Another widely used copayment regime is reference pricing, where consumers have to
pay the full price di¤erence between generic and brand-name drugs if choosing to purchase
the latter. In this case, the copayment schedule is given by
ci =
8><>: r + (pb   r) + f if i = bpg + f if i = g ; (6)
where r 2 (pg; pg) is the reference price. The branded-generic copayment di¤erence is now
given by cb   cg = pb   pg   (1  ) r. We see that, compared with a simple coinsur-
ance scheme (r = pb), reference pricing (r < pb) increases the branded-generic copayment
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di¤erence. Thus, for given retail prices, reference pricing increases the optimal substi-
tution e¤ort and strengthens the relationship between relative margins and substitution
incentives.
What are the e¤ects of retail price changes on substitution e¤ort? If the copayments
do not depend on prices, there are no demand e¤ects, and price changes only a¤ect the
pharmacy margins. Thus, a higher brand-name retail price is equivalent to a lower brand-
name wholesale price, with the corresponding e¤ects on substitution e¤ort as described
above. Let us therefore assume a coinsurance regime, where the copayment is dened by
(5). Total di¤erentiation of the rst-order condition for optimal e¤ort, (4), gives
@e
@pb
=   @e
@pg
=  


(mg mb) (pb pg)
(v v)(1 )2

0 (e)
(mg mb)(cb cg)
(v v)

00(1 )+2(0)2
(1 )3

  C 00
; (7)
where the denominator is negative due to the second-order condition.
Consider a marginal reduction in the brand-name retail price. There are two counter-
acting e¤ects on incentives for substitution e¤ort: 1) the corresponding reduction in the
brand-name margin increases incentives for substitution e¤ort, while 2) the correspond-
ing lower price di¤erence between the two drug versions makes consumers more di¢ cult
to persuade and therefore reduces incentives for substitution. If the di¤erence in mar-
gins is higher than the price di¤erence, the rst incentive dominates and a brand-name
price reduction leads to higher substitution e¤ort. In this case, the pharmacys incen-
tive for inducing more generic substitution will counteract the direct demand e¤ect of a
brand-name price reduction, making the increase in brand-name market share less than it
would otherwise have been. In the other case, where (mg  mb) is smaller than (pb   pg),
the pharmacys incentive to reduce substitution e¤ort will reinforce the direct demand
response of a lower brand-name price.
3.2 Endogenous retail prices
If the pharmacy can set the retail prices of the generic and brand-name drugs, it has
another instrument to steer demand towards the most protable drug version. Given
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that copayments depend on prices, demand for the two drugs depend on the retail price
di¤erence between the brand-name and the generic drugs. For a given value of , the
pharmacy faces the following trade-o¤ when deciding the optimal retail price di¤erence.
If pb = pg, the generic drug is more protable for the pharmacy to sell (since wg < wb),
but in order to make consumers choose the generic drug, it has to be priced lower than
the brand-name. The further pg is reduced below pb, the larger is the share of consumers
choosing the generic. However, lowering pg reduces the protability of selling the generic
drug. Thus, the pharmacy maximises prots by choosing a branded-generic retail price
di¤erence that optimally trades o¤ these two incentives.
As long as total demand is inelastic, the pharmacy would obviously want to set the
optimal price di¤erence at the highest possible level. Thus, we assume that retail price
setting is restricted by price cap regulation, that species the highest possible retail price
that the pharmacy can set. From the above discussion, if follows that the price cap always
binds for the brand-name drug. In the following, we will briey discuss optimal retail price
setting and implications for substitution incentives under di¤erent copayment scenarios.
3.2.1 Simple coinsurance
Assume that copayments are given by (5). Maximising (3) with respect to pg, the optimal
retail price di¤erence is given by
pb   pg = (wb   wg)
2
+
(1  ) v
2
: (8)
Notice that the retail price di¤erence is constant, implying that any change in the brand-
name retail price (e.g., due to stricter price cap regulation) will be exactly matched by a
corresponding change in the generic retail price.12 Demand for the generic drug is given
by
Dg =
 (wb   wg)  (1  ) v
2 (v   v) (1  ) : (9)
12This property follows from the assumptions of full market coverage and uniform distribution of v.
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Inserting the optimal price di¤erence into (4), the rst-order condition for optimal substi-
tution e¤ort is given by
 (wb   wg)2 0 (e)
4 (v   v) (1  )2   C
0 (e) = 0: (10)
When the generic price is optimally adjusted, substitution e¤ort depends only on the
branded-generic wholesale price di¤erence. A higher wholesale price for the brand-name
(generic) drug will increase (reduce) substitution e¤ort. If we consider the relationship
between wholesale prices and market shares, pharmacy incentives for expending substitu-
tion e¤ort will have reinforcing e¤ects when the branded-generic retail price di¤erence is
endogenous:
1. A reduction in the brand-name wholesale price leads to an increase in the generic
retail price, which directly increases demand for the brand-name drug. This e¤ect is
reinforced by the fact that the pharmacy will spend less e¤ort on generic substitution.
2. A reduction in the generic wholesale price leads to a reduction in the generic retail
price, which directly increases demand for the generic drug. This e¤ect is reinforced
by the fact that the pharmacy will spend more e¤ort on generic substitution.
3.2.2 Reference pricing
Consider a reference pricing scheme where copayments are given by (6). Assuming that
r 2 (pg; pb), the optimal generic retail price (hence implicitly the optimal retail price
di¤erence), is given by
pg =
(1 + ) pb   (1  ) r    (wb   wg)  (1  ) v
2
: (11)
This price is indeed below the reference price if pb < r+
(wb wg)+(1 )v
1+ . Demand for the
generic drug is now
Dg =
(1  ) (pb   r) +  (wb   wg)  (1  ) v
2 (v   v) (1  ) : (12)
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If r = pb, this solution is obviously identical to the solution under a simple coinsurance
system. Thus, we can analyse the e¤ect of reference pricing by considering a marginal
reduction in r, evaluated at r = pb. The e¤ect on the optimal retail price is given by
@pg
@r =  1 2 < 0, implying that reference pricing reduces the optimal price di¤erence
between brand-names and generics. The reason is that reference pricing increases consumer
incentives for generic substitution, as the demand becomes more price sensitive above the
reference price. However, this means that the pharmacys optimal substitution e¤ort
increases, since the di¤erence in margins becomes larger (due to the higher generic retail
price). This is easily seen by substituting pg from (11) into the rst-order condition for
optimal substitution e¤ort, yielding:
((1  ) (pb   r) +  (wb   wg))2   ((1  ) v)2
4 (v   v) (1  )2  
0 (e)  C 0 (e) = 0: (13)
So far we have considered an exogenous reference pricing system, where the reference
price does not depend on actual retail prices. The alternative is an endogenous reference
pricing system, where the reference price is a function of actual drug prices. A simple
way to illustrate such a copayment scheme is to dene the reference price as a linear
combination of brand-name and generic retail prices: r = pg + (1  ) pb. The optimal
retail price di¤erence is now given by
pb   pg = (wb   wg)
2
+
(1  ) v
2 (+    ) ; (14)
which gives the following demand for the generic drug:
Dg =
(wb   wg) (+    )  (1  ) v
2 (v   v) (1  ) : (15)
A straightforward comparison between (8) and (14) shows that, compared with a
simple coinsurance scheme ( = 0), endogenous reference pricing ( > 0) reduces the
optimal retail price di¤erence between generics and brand-names. Thus, the e¤ects of
exogenous and endogenous reference pricing are qualitatively similar. As before, as smaller
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retail price di¤erence increases the pharmacys incentives for expending substitution e¤ort.
Substituting the optimal retail price di¤erence from (14) into (4), the rst-order condition
for optimal substitution e¤ort is given by
((wb   wg) (+    ))2   ((1  ) v)2
4 (v   v) (1  )2 (+    ) 
0 (e)  C 0 (e) = 0: (16)
It is straightforward to verify that the marginal revenue of substitution e¤ort is increasing
in .
We summarise our theoretical analysis as follows:
Proposition 1 (i) For given retail prices, pharmacy incentives for expending e¤ort to-
wards generic substitution are stronger the larger the di¤erence in margins between generics
and brand-names (mg  mg), and the larger the di¤erence in copayments between brand-
names and generics (cb   cg).
(ii) If pharmacies are free to set retail prices (but subject to price cap regulation), the
introduction of reference pricing (exogenous or endogenous) will reduce the retail price dif-
ference between brand-names and generics and increase pharmacy incentives for expending
substitution e¤ort.
4 Institutional Background
The Norwegian pharmacy market was liberalised in 2001. Before the liberalisation, entry
and location were determined by a governmental health agency, and ownership was re-
stricted to pharmacists. The new act removed these restrictions, making Norway one of
the pioneers in Europe in this regard. Most European countries still have strict restrictions
on entry and ownership, though the European Commission is pushing for deregulation of
the pharmacy sector.
The liberalisation in Norway caused dramatic changes to the pharmacy market struc-
ture. Almost over night most of the about 400 pharmacies owned by self-employed phar-
macists were sold to three international wholesalers. The three wholesalers are Norsk
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Medisinaldepot (owned by Celesio AG), Alliance Healthcare (owned by Alliance Boots
Ltd) and Apokjeden (owned by Tamro Oy and Phoenix AG). Besides purchasing exist-
ing pharmacies, the wholesalers established many new pharmacies, especially in non-rural
areas. The number of pharmacies has increased to 662 in 2009, which is an increase of
almost 70 percent since 2001. Table 1 below illustrates the current market situation.
[ Table 1 about here ]
The market is dominated by four pharmacy chains (Alliance, Apotek 1, Vitusapotek
and Ditt Apotek) covering more than 96 percent of the total number of pharmacies.
The three largest chains are vertically integrated with the wholesalers, where Alliance
apotekene is owned by Alliance healthcare, Apotek 1 is owned by Apokjeden, and Vi-
tusapotek is owned by Norsk Medisinaldepot. The fourth chain, Ditt Apotek, is a fran-
chise of Norsk Medisinaldepot consisting of 48 privately owned pharmacies and 33 publicly
owned hospital pharmacies. The remaining pharmacies are independent, but have organ-
ised a joint procurement entity with a purchasing contract with Alliance. Thus, the three
wholesalers serve the whole retail (outpatient) pharmacy market.
The market is extensively regulated. Several of the regulations have implications for
market structure and rm behaviour. First, there are restrictions on the vertical relation-
ship between producers and distributors of pharmaceuticals. Pharmaceutical companies
are not allowed to own distributors (wholesalers and pharmacies). This is to our knowl-
edge a general prohibition in all Western countries. Moreover, the wholesalers are required
to store and deliver the full range of pharmaceuticals with a marketing licence that are
demanded by patients (prescribed by physicians).13 This means that distributors must
carry all brand-names and cannot make (exclusive dealing) contracts with a subset of the
brand-name producers. This regulation has also implications for the o¤-patent market
segment in the sense that the wholesalers cannot make a contract with a generic producer
13"Important" drugs should be delivered within 24 hours, while less important drugs have a 48 hour
delivery deadline.
17
that excludes the original brand-name product. However, the wholesalers can o¤er one
generic producer a contract that excludes rival generic producers. Thus, the wholesalers
bargaining power is clearly stronger in the generic market.
Second, the demand for prescription drugs is extensively subsidised at the point of
consumption due to insurance against medical expenditures. However, there is cost-sharing
through coinsurance. As a general rule patients pay a fraction (36 percent) of the price
of the drug they demand up to certain expenditure caps. Once these caps are reached,
there is 100 percent coverage from the public insurer. Figures show that the de facto
cost sharing is 30-70, where the public insurer covers 70 percent of total pharmaceutical
expenditures (LMI, 2009).
Third, since insurance reduces the price elasticity of demand for pharmaceuticals,
there are various restrictions on pricing. All prescription drugs are subject to price cap
regulation. The price cap is based on international price comparisons (external referencing)
and xed at wholesale level.14 Adding a maximum mark-up denes the price cap at
pharmacy (retail) level. Brand-names and generics face the same price cap, though in
practice the cap is usually binding only for the brand-name.
In 2003 the government introduced reference pricing (internal referencing) for a sub-
sample of the o¤-patent molecules with generic competition. This system has been ex-
tended to all new molecules for which the patent expires and generic competition takes
place.15 The reference price, which is the maximum reimbursement for all products with
a given molecule, is dened as a "discount" on the price cap for this molecule.16 The rms
are free to charge prices above the reference price (though constrained by the price cap).
However, if a product is priced above the reference price, patients that demand this drug
14Producers must report their prices in nine reference countries (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Irland, the Netherlands, Sweden and United Kingdom). The price cap is dened as the average
of the three lowest prices in the reference countries and updated annually.
15There has also been a modication of the reference price system. The rst version called "indekspris"
dened the reference price as a sales weighted sum of brand-name and generic prices (see, Brekke et
al. 2009, 2010). This system was replaced by "trinnpris" in January 2005, where the reference price is
calculated as a discount on the price cap prior to generic competition.
16The discount is progressive. First, the reference price is 70 percent of the price cap before generic
competition. Then after 6 months the reference price is reduced to 45 or 25 percent depending on it sales
value. Finally, after 18 months the reference price is reduced to 35 or 20 percent.
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must pay the di¤erence between the charged price and the reference price out-of-pocket (in
addition to coinsurance). This price di¤erence will not be covered by the public insurer
even if the patients medical costs have reached the expenditure cap. The intention is
to induce consumers to substitute to a lower priced generic and/or get the brand-name
producer to reduce its price.
Notably, the price regulations restrict pricing at retail and wholesale level, but not at
producer level. The producer prices are freely set by the pharmaceutical companies or in
negotiations with the wholesalers.
5 Data and descriptive statistics
In the empirical analysis we use data from the Prescription and the Wholesale databases of
the Norwegian Institute of Public Health. The Prescription database contains information
about all prescription bound sales at pharmacy level in Norway from 2004 and onwards.
From this database we have information about average prices and volumes per quarter
over a four-year period (2004-7). Prices and volumes are in dened daily doses (DDD) per
product (package) per pharmacy. The dataset also provides detailed information about
product name, manufacturer, launch date, package size, presentation form, dosage, etc.
In addition, we have information about ownership and chain a¢ liation for each pharmacy
over the period. We merge these data with data from the Wholesale database, which
contains information about producer (ex-manufacturer) prices (in DDD) per product for
each wholesaler.
We aim at studying the incentives of pharmacies to steer consumers from (prescribed)
brand-names towards potentially more protable generic drugs. We therefore limit our
data along two dimensions. First, we restrict attention only to o¤-patent molecules with
generic competition.17 Moreover, for each molecule we include only the products that are
on the generic substitution list, as dened by the Norwegian Medicines Agency. This list
consists of the products for which the pharmacies are allowed to dispense a generic to
17Table A1 in the Appendix provides a complete list of the molecules in our sample, as well as descriptive
statistics of our key variables.
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patients with a brand-name prescription. Thus, we are able to identify the set of products
where pharmacy margins are likely to play a role for generic sales.18 This leaves us with a
sample of 74 o¤-patent substances with generic competition. Second, we restrict attention
to vertically integrated pharmacies. We could potentially look at the product margins at
pharmacy level. However, almost 85 percent of the pharmacies in the Norwegian market
are owned by the wholesalers. For these pharmacies it makes little sense to look at only
the downstream margins. Consequently, we exclude all transactions between wholesalers
and vertically separated pharmacies.
For each of the three wholesalers (pharmacy chains) we calculate separate brand-
name and generic prices as product averages for each substance at both producer (ex-
manufacturer) and retail level. Based on this, we derive the gross margin for brand-
names and generics for each vertically integrated pharmacy chain. We report margins
both in absolute and in percentage terms. The absolute margin is the di¤erence between
the producer price and the retail pharmacy price. The percentage margin is simply the
absolute margin divided by the retail pharmacy price. This measure corresponds to the
Lerner-index, which is a common measure of mark-ups and market power in industries.
Finally, we compute for each wholesaler (pharmacy chain) the brand-name market share
as the brand-name sales volume (in DDD) divided by the total sales volume for each
substance per period.
Table 2 below provides an overview of the means and standard deviations of our key
variables across the three pharmacy chains, as well as the industry gures.
[ Table 2 about here ]
From the table we see that the average brand-name market shares vary from about 39
to 45 percent across the wholesalers. We also see that the average brand-name prices (per
DDD) are higher than the average generic prices on retail level for all three wholesalers,
18 In Table A1 in the Appendix, we have a variable called the "percentage changeable", which is the
share of sales (measured in DDD) of products within a given substance that are on the substitution list.
According to this measure, a signicant share of the sales are subject to generic substitution.
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though there is some variation in the levels across the chains. The gures are in Norwegian
kroner (NOK), where 1 Euro is approximately 8 NOK.
If we look at product margins, we see that brand-names have a mark-up of about 47-49
percent, while the generic margins are about 67-68 percent. The percentage margins are
quite high and fairly similar across the wholesalers, suggesting signicant (and symmetric)
downstream market power.
While the percentage margin is a convenient measure that is frequently used, one
needs to be careful with its interpretation when products di¤er in prices. In particular,
in our case, where we have high-priced brand-names and low-priced generics, the absolute
margins might actually be higher for brand-names, though the percentage margins are
not. However, as can be seen from Table 2, the absolute margins are also signicantly
higher for the generics. While the generic margin varies from 6.31 to 7.58 NOK per DDD
across the wholesalers, the brand-name margins vary from 4.6 to 5.28 NOK per DDD.
Since we are interested in the relationship between product margins and market shares,
it is useful to see how these variables develop over time. Figure 1-3 below plot the changes
in our key variables for each of the three wholesalers (pharmacy chains) for the period of
2004 until 2008.
[ Figures 1-3 about here ]
Notice that the gures are based on products that are present in our sample for the whole
period. The reason is, of course, that entry of new substances and/or products will shift
the average prices, margins and market shares, so that trends over time will be hard to
detect. Since most of the products are present in the sample for the whole period, the
gures should be fairly representative.19
The gures show a clear tendency. On the one hand, the average percentage margin
of generics increases quite steeply, while the brand-name margins are fairly stable. This
pattern is relatively robust across pharmacy chains. On the other hand, the brand-name
market shares are decreasing for all wholesalers, though with the steepest change for
19This can be readily veried from Table A1 in the Appendix.
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wholesaler 1. The descriptive statistics in Table 2 and the graphs in Figure 1-3 indicate
a relationship between brand-name and generic product margins and their market shares.
We take a closer look at this in the next section.
6 Empirical method and results
In this section we aim at estimating the e¤ect of product margins on market shares. Having
detailed product level panel data for 74 substances over four years (2004-7), we use xed
e¤ect regressions to estimate the impact of margins on brand-name market shares. More
precisely, we estimate the following xed e¤ect model:
Yikt = aik + t +  m0ikt +  X0ikt + "ikt; (17)
where Yikt is the brand-name market share of substance i of wholesaler (pharmacy chain)
k at time t. Moreover, aik is a substance xed e¤ect (dummy) for each wholesaler that
captures unobserved factors that is constant over time. This is a very exible specication,
where we allow the intercepts for each substance to be di¤erent across wholesalers.20 By
including these xed e¤ects, we control for unobserved factors e.g., brand-name market-
ing, physiciansprescription behaviour, wholesaler management and strategy di¤erences,
etc. that are likely to e¤ect brand-name market shares. Time trends in market shares
are captured by period specic variables t.
The variable m0ikt contains our main observables of interest, namely the margins of
brand-names and generics. A higher generic (brand-name) margin should provide stronger
(weaker) incentives for the pharmacy to persuade consumers to substitute, suggesting a
negative (positive) relationship with our dependent variable. We estimate the e¤ects sepa-
rately for the brand-name and generic margins, which allows us to account for potentially
asymmetric e¤ects.
We also control for price di¤erences at pharmacy level between brand-names and gener-
20An alternative would be to have separate dummies for substances and wholesalers. However, this is a
less exible specication than having one dummy per substance per wholesaler.
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ics. As described in Section 3, a change in the pharmacy retail price a¤ects both the margin
and the copayment. While copayments a¤ect demand, margins are not observed by the
consumers and thus only a¤ect the pharmacys incentives to promote generics. These
e¤ects pull in opposite directions. A lower, say, generic price makes it more likely that
consumers will switch to a generic, but less likely that the pharmacy will suggest a generic
substitute because of a lower generic margin. Controlling for pharmacy price di¤erences
between brand-names and generics allows us to disentangle these two counteracting forces
with respect to market shares.
The results from the xed e¤ect regressions are reported in Table 3.
[ Table 3 about here ]
Our results indicate strong and highly signicant e¤ects on brand-name market shares
of product margins measured either in percentage or absolute terms. We see that a one
percentage point increase in the percentage brand-name (generic) margin results in a 0.37
(0.408) percentage point increase (decrease) in the brand-name market share. If we look
at absolute margins, we nd that an increase of 1 NOK of selling a brand-name (generic)
leads to a 3.2 (1.1) percentage point increase (decrease) in the brand-name market shares.
While the e¤ects are fairly symmetric for percentage margins, this is not the case for
absolute margins. However, an increase of 1 NOK is a larger change for brand-names than
for generics, as they have a lower average margin, as reported in Table 2.
The e¤ects of product margins on market shares emerge after controlling for brand-
name and generic pharmacy price di¤erences. In estimating the e¤ect of percentage mar-
gins, we use the relative branded-generic prices as control variables. However, when es-
timating the e¤ect of absolute margins, we instead use absolute price di¤erences, as this
also accounts for levels, not just relative di¤erences in retail pharmacy prices. We see from
Table 3, that a one unit increase in the relative pharmacy prices, which is a very large
change in branded-generic price di¤erences, results in a 13.1 percentage point reduction
in the brand-name market share. Moreover, a 1 NOK increase in the absolute branded-
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generic price di¤erence reduces the brand-name market share with 2.6 percentage points.
Thus, it is more likely that a consumer ends up with a generic drug if the price di¤erence,
and thus the copayment di¤erence, between brand-names and generics becomes larger.
6.1 The role of the copayment structure
As shown in the theory section, the copayment structure might be important for the
pharmacies substitution incentives. If consumers face the same copayment for brand-
names and generics, getting them to accept a generic substitute is hard, since they have
no nancial motive to switch. Coinsurance is a mechanism to directly link the copayments
to the medical costs. By paying a fraction of the price, as a cost-sharing rule, a price
reduction in, say, a generic drug directly translates into a reduction in the copayment
for this product. Reference pricing extends the cost-sharing even further by requiring
patients to pay the di¤erence between the high-priced brand-name and the maximum
reimbursement price (reference price), in addition to regular copayments.
The pharmaceuticals in our data are either under standard coinsurance or reference
pricing, as explained in Section 4. Based on the theoretical analysis, we expect pharmacies
to expend more e¤ort on persuading consumers to switch to generics under reference
pricing, since the copayment di¤erence is generally larger than under simple coinsurance.
Thus, there should be a stronger relationship between brand-name and generic product
margins and their market shares for the drugs that are exposed to reference pricing. To
test this, we split the sample according to the copayment schedule, and run separate
regressions on the two subsamples of drugs, using the same xed e¤ect model as in (17).
Table 4 below reports the empirical results.
[ Table 4 about here ]
When we look at absolute margins, we see, as expected, that the e¤ects are stronger
for both brand-name and generic margins for products under reference pricing compared
with standard coinsurance. Moreover, we see that the e¤ect of brand-name percentage
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margins also become stronger for products under reference pricing, but for generics the
result is opposite. However, the general trend is that reference pricing reinforces the e¤ect
of product margins on market shares. One obvious reason for this is that the copayment
di¤erences are much smaller under coinsurance than reference pricing, which make it more
di¢ cult to persuade consumers to purchase a generic version instead of the brand-name.
In addition, the expenditure caps, as described in Section 3, applies only to the coinsurance
part of the copayment, and not to the extra surcharges under reference pricing. These
ndings (with exception of generic percentage margins) are in line with our theoretical
predictions in Section 2.
6.2 Potential endogeneity
A potential concern is that the empirical results reported above might be biased due
endogenous explanatory variables. While it seems fairly obvious that pharmacies (or any
retailer) would promote products with higher margins to their costumers, we cannot a
priori rule out that product margins might be inuenced by market shares. It could
also be that pharmacy prices, and thus pharmacy price di¤erences, are endogenous. We
account for potential endogeneity, by applying a xed e¤ect IV estimator21 that is robust
to, and e¢ cient in the presence of, arbitrary serial correlation and heteroskedasticity (see
Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman, 2007).22 In this regression we treat margins and retail price
di¤erences as endogenous variables. As instruments we use rst, second and third lags of
the endogenous variables.23 We nd it reasonable to assume that the margins in period
t   1 are correlated with the margins in period t, but not directly with the market share
in period t.
Orthogonality of the instruments is tested by Hansens J statistic, which is consis-
21 IV models were estimated using the Stata module xtivreg2 (Scha¤er, 2007).
22The long-run heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix is generated using
the Bartlett kernel function with a bandwidth of 4. According to Baum, Scha¤er and Stillman (2007),
a common choice of bandwidth for these kernels is a value related to the periodicity of the data (4 for
quarterly, 12 for monthly, etc.).
23We have also estimated models where we use second and third lags of the endogenous variables as
instruments. The estimated coe¢ cients are very close to the ones reported in Table 3, but the standard
errors are larger.
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tent in the presence of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (the null hypothesis is that
the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term). However, instrument exogeneity
is only one of the two criteria necessary for instruments to be valid. If the instruments
are uncorrelated, or only weakly correlated, with the endogenous variables, then sampling
distributions of the IV statistics are in general non-normal, and standard IV estimates, hy-
pothesis tests and condence intervals are unreliable. Hence, tests for underidentication
and weak identication are reported. The underidentication test is a Lagrange multiplier
(LM) test of whether the excluded instruments are correlated with the endogenous regres-
sors (the null hypothesis is that the equation is underidentied). The weak instrument test
statistic is based on the Kleibergen-Paap rk statistic. As a rule of thumbthis F-statistic
should be at least 10 for weak identication not to be considered a problem (Staiger and
Stock, 1997).
The results from the xed e¤ect IV model are reported Table 5.24 We rst notice that
the Sargan-Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis
(i.e., the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term), suggesting that the set of
instruments is valid. Considering the underidentication test, the null hypothesis (i.e., the
equation is underidentied) is rejected, which implies that the model is identied. Further,
the weak identication tests suggest that the correlation between the instruments and the
endogenous variables is su¢ ciently strong.
From Table 5, we see that the results have become stronger when looking at the impact
of absolute margins. Now a 1 NOK increase in the brand-name margin (per DDD) results
in a 4.13 percentage point increase in the brand-name market share. Also the e¤ect of
absolute generic margins has become stronger. Looking at percentage margins, we see
that the e¤ect of brand-name margins has become stronger, while the e¤ect of generic
margins has become weaker. Thus, with the exception of generic percentage margins, the
IV xed e¤ect model tend to reinforce the e¤ects of product margins on market shares, but
the changes in the coe¢ cients are modest, suggesting limited problems with endogenous
explanatory variables.
24First step results are available upon request.
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7 Policy implications
As mentioned in Section 2, the previous literature on generic competition has focused
either on physiciansprescribing practices or on the design of the patient reimbursement
system for prescription drugs. In the present paper, we have found that pharmacy in-
centives are also likely to play a crucial role in determining generic sales and thereby
total pharmaceutical expenditures. What are the possible policy implications of this nd-
ing? We would here like to emphasise two di¤erent implications for optimal regulation of
pharmaceutical markets that follow from our analysis.
First, our empirical results indicate that pharmacy margins on branded versus generic
drugs have a sizeable impact on generic market shares. This suggests that mark-up reg-
ulation at the pharmacy level could potentially be an additional powerful instrument in
order to stimulate generic competition and thereby obtain cost savings. However, the
important lesson from our analysis is that the e¤ect of mark-up regulation on generic
competition depends crucially on the design of the regulation scheme. More specically,
a regressive mark-up scheme that provides lower absolute margins on higher priced drugs
(brand-names) will provide pharmacies with incentives to steer demand towards cheaper
generic drugs. On the other hand, a xed percentage mark-up will automatically im-
ply that pharmacies have higher margins on (higher-priced) brand-name drugs, which is
detrimental for stimulating generic competition. Although these insights are not new, our
empirical analysis suggests that the quantitative impact of qualitatively di¤erent mark-up
schemes is potentially large.
Second, our analysis also casts additional light on the e¤ects of a widely used instru-
ment for stimulating generic competition, namely reference pricing. In our theoretical
model, we show that reference pricing reinforces pharmacy incentives for expending e¤ort
on persuading consumers to switch from brand-names to generics. We are also able to
conrm this e¤ect in our empirical analysis. Thus, by explicitly taking pharmacy incen-
tives into account, we are able to identify an additional channel through which reference
pricing stimulates generic competition. Our analysis can therefore be seen as o¤ering an
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additional argument for introducing reference pricing (or any other reimbursement scheme
that increases the relative patient copayment for branded versus generic drugs) in order
to contain the growth in pharmaceutical spending.
8 Concluding remarks
The functioning of pharmaceutical markets is complex and far from perfectly understood.
One of the most studied yet less understood issues, is that of generic competition in the
o¤-patent market for prescription drugs. Compared to markets for ordinary consumption
goods, a complicating factor is that demand for prescription drugs is partly determined as
a result of interactions between prescribing physicians and patients. However, we argue
that there are also other complicating, and less understood, factors. In the present paper
we have examined a hitherto neglected factor in explaining generic competition, namely
the role of dispensing pharmacies. More specically, we have analysed  theoretically
and empirically the incentive for pharmacies to promote generic instead of brand-name
drugs.
Based on a theoretical model of vertical di¤erentiation, we show that pharmacy in-
centives to steer demand towards generic drugs are increasing in both relative margins
and relative copayments between brand-names and generics. These e¤ects are empirically
conrmed in the second part of our paper, where we use Norwegian data on sales and
prices at both producer (ex-manufacturer) and retail (pharmacy) level for 74 o¤-patent
substances with generic competition over a four-year period (2004-7). Controlling for
relative retail prices of brand-names and generics, we nd strong and highly signicant
e¤ects of brand-name and generic margins on their market shares, implying that pharma-
cies are expending more e¤ort on promoting generics when their margins on generics are
high relative to those on brand-names. Thus, our results strongly suggest that dispensing
pharmacies are not perfect agents for patients and that pharmacy incentives are important
for stimulating generic sales.
Before concluding the paper, we would like to stress some potential caveats with our
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study. Our theoretical analysis takes producer prices as given. Obviously, this is a simplify-
ing assumption. Producer prices are determined in negotiations between the (brand-name
and generic) producers and the wholesalers. It would be of great interest to study the
determination of the producer prices as a result of a bargaining game between these two
parties, but this is clearly beyond the scope of the current paper and is therefore left for
future research.
In our empirical study, we observe gross product margins. However, distribution costs
might di¤er across wholesalers and pharmacy chains, and give rise to di¤erent net mar-
gins. Moreover, we do not observe potential side-payments between the producers and the
wholesalers, which might a¤ect the overall protability of selling specic products. How-
ever, as long as these factors are fairly consistent over time, they should be captured by
our substance-wholesaler xed e¤ect dummies. There are also regulations that restricts
the use of side-payments. The government requires that discounts given to the whole-
salers should be reected in the producer prices and cannot be given as a xed lump-sum
transfer. It is also the case that the distributorsincentives are a¤ected by the marginal
protability of selling a specic product, which is exactly what we nd in our data.
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Pharmacy chains, number of pharmacies, 2009. 
Alliance apotekene 144 
Apotek 1 244 
Vitusapotek 169 
Ditt Apotek (hospital pharmacies) 81 (33) 
Independent pharmacies 24 
Total 662 
 
 
Table 2. Sample characteristics, means and standard errors in parentheses 
 Wholesaler 1 
(apokjeden) 
Wholesaler 2 
(holtung) 
Wholesaler 3 
(nmd) 
Industry 
Brand-name market share 38.71 (28.75) 44.65 (29.70) 45.38 (30.50) 42.98 (29.81) 
Brand-name retail price 11.26 (23.60) 12.75 (24.97) 12.96 (26.39) 12.34 (25.04) 
Generic retail price 9.68 (19.39) 10.80 (21.32) 10.58 (19.63) 10.37 (20.15) 
Abs. brand-name margin 4.60 (8.20) 5.06 (12.58) 5.28 (9.17) 4.99 (8.67) 
Abs. generic margin 6.31 (16.28) 7.58 (18.98) 7.16 (16.78) 7.03 (17.41) 
% brand-name margin 47.31 (11.99) 46.69 (12.58) 48.98 (13.24) 47.66 (12.65) 
% generic margin 66.76 (16.63) 67.60 (17.89) 67.42 (17.66) 67.27 (17.41) 
Number of observations 901 952 942 2795 
 
 
 
Table 3. The effect of pharmacy margins on brand-name market shares, fixed effect 
results with robust standard errors 
 Percentage margin Absolute margin 
Brand-name margin 0.370*** (0.110) 3.199*** (0.647) 
Generic margin -0.408*** (0.059) -1.075*** (0.295) 
Relative price -13.098*** (2.817) - 
Price difference - -2.600*** (0.475) 
Constant 75.917*** (6.923) 51.337*** (2.267) 
Wholesaler-product 
dummies 
Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.332 0.263 
Number ATC-groups 74 74 
Number observations 2795 2795 
 
Table 4. The effect of pharmacy margins on brand-name market shares, fixed effect 
results with robust standard errors 
 Percentage margin Absolute margin 
 Reference 
pricing
Co-insurance Reference 
pricing
Co-insurance 
Brand-name margin 0.514*** 
(0.134) 
0.233  
(0.208) 
3.469*** 
(1.154) 
0.996  
(0.688) 
Generic margin -0.310*** 
(0.093) 
-0.466*** 
(0.081) 
-1.321*** 
(0.525) 
-0.851*** 
(0.252) 
Relative price -12.751*** 
(3.026) 
-14.729*** 
(5.986) 
- - 
Price difference - - -2.891*** 
(0.765) 
-0.920** 
(0.470) 
Constant 70.305*** 
(8.819) 
84.739*** 
(10.516) 
57.883*** 
(4.455) 
56.854*** 
(3.837) 
Wholesaler-product 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.392 0.278 0.337 0.191 
Number ATC-groups 32 42 32 42 
Number observations 1171 1624 1171 1624 
 
 
Table 5. The effect of pharmacy margins on brand-name market shares, IV fixed 
effect results with robust standard errors 
 Percentage margin Absolute margin 
Brand-name margin 0.549***  
(0.110) 
4.126***  
(1.102) 
Generic margin -0.288***  
(0.062) 
-1.283*** 
 (0.410) 
Relative price -11.278*** (2.229) - 
Price difference - -2.957***  
(0.589) 
Wholesaler-product 
dummies 
Yes Yes 
Period dummies Yes Yes 
Overidentification test 
( Hansen J statistics) 
0.528 0.144 
Underidentification test 
P-value 
0.000 0.001 
Weak identification test 
( Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistic) 
44.888 5.341 
Number ATC-groups 71 71 
Number observations 2128 2128 
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics (prices per DDD) 
ATC code Market  
share 
Pharmacy 
price brand 
name 
Producer 
price  
brand name 
Pharmacy  
price  
generics 
Producer  
price  
generics 
Percentage  
changeable 
Ref. 
pricing 
Number  
of obs. 
A02BA02 44.67 4.29 2.01 3.89 1.37 99.97 Yes 48  
A02BA03 43.83 10.81 7.21 9.87 2.56 100.00 No 48  
A02BC01 52.54 9.79 6.08 8.17 3.92 100.00 Yes 48  
A02BC03 8.39 11.46 7.39 9.19 3.69 77.89 Yes 9 
A03FA01 2.11 4.63 1.85 6.84 2.05 99.94 No 32 
A04AA01 74.72 204.43 142.71 169.73 12.90 90.47 No   26 
A07EC07 48.76 11.28 7.47 14.74 9.79 74.90 No 48 
A10BA02 64.22 2.28 1.11 2.25 0.61 100.00 No 48 
A10BB12 63.98 1.97 0.98 1.69 0.34 100 Yes 20 
C01DA14 6.66 2.64 1.46 2.14 1.02 68.67 No 48 
C03DA01 13.65 3.41 1.91 3.04 1.13 100 No 48 
C03EA01 27.28 0.81 0.38 0.59 0.17 100 No 48 
C07AA05 75.72 3.93 2.28 2.49 0.68 86.64 No 40 
C07AB02 99.76 6.95 3.39 3.34 1.21 99.74 No 48 
C07AB03 26.69 1.58 0.75 1.52 0.42 100 Yes 48 
C08CA01 24.78 3.42 2.07 1.96 0.40 100 Yes 47 
C08CA02 31.82 2.73 1.69 1.99 0.33 100 Yes 41 
C08DA01 29.74 3.01 1.44 2.81 0.84 36.06 No 48 
C09AA02 33.77 1.83 0.75 1.82 0.48 100 Yes 48 
C09AA03 27.39 2.78 1.51 2.41 0.67 100 Yes 48 
C09AA05 48.96 1.76 0.87 1.74 0.38 99.91 Yes 34 
C09BA02 38.58 3.48 1.87 3.37 0.97 93.98 Yes 48 
C09BA03 31.27 4.26 2.50 3.18 0.72 100 Yes 45 
C10AA01 28.42 2.62 1.42 2.66 0.76 100 Yes 48 
C10AA02 32.92 11.21 6.89 9.74 2.13 100 No 48 
C10AA03 18.92 6.84 4.89 3.23 0.89 100 Yes 36 
D01BA02 11.25 20.46 14.12 13.08 2.15 100 Yes 33 
G03CA03 19.61 2.74 1.71 3.45 2.10 18.74 No 48 
G03HB01 52.35 2.17 1.30 1.79 0.38 100 No 23 
H01BA02 96.87 27.77 16.36 18.70 11.01 91.70 No 22 
J01AA02 6.41 7.45 3.64 6.85 2.13 99.92 No 24 
J01CA04 47.55 13.93 7.05 9.71 3.24 100 Yes 48 
J01FA01 36.40 13.07 5.89 12.80 5.75 18.73 No 48 
J01FA09 24.26 20.16 12.31 12.41 3.91 65.08 Yes 40 
J01MA02 32.44 27.87 14.40 22.91 5.78 100 Yes 37 
J02AC01 40.61 103.01 57.82 74.68 13.86 98.22 Yes 45 
L02AE02 69.17 45.74 32.95 45.56 32.91 96.17 No 46 
L02BA01 41.18 4.75 2.64 4.13 1.17 100 No 48 
L02BB03 82.81 48.59 34.42 42.24 9.97 100 No 6 
L04AX03 85.31 2.06 0.88 1.87 0.94 98.26 No 47 
M01AB05 58.07 4.29 1.65 4.03 1.44 87.20 Yes 48 
M01AC01 8.86 3.47 1.84 3.34 0.91 10.63 No 48 
M01AC06 85.63 4.65 1.47 5.21 1.69 99.91 Yes 20 
M01AE01 3.63 3.73 1.38 3.72 0.96 32.85 No 24 
M01AE02 12.52 3.49 1.73 2.85 0.96 32.85 No 24 
M01AX05 33.51 2.71 0.95 3.40 1.58 97.78 No 6 
M04AA01 35.35 2.92 1.16 2.82 0.67 100 No 48 
M05BA04 10.91 10.27 7.23 4.79 0.68 100 Yes 24 
N02AB03 84.10 44.17 27.84 35.85 9.85 96.50 No 18 
N02AX02 37.48 12.31 3.78 11.72 2.00 63.63 No 48 
N02BE01 23.10 2.36 0.76 4.63 1.42 100 No 48 
N02CC01 69.52 90.23 29.35 60.73 9.39 98.27 Yes 12 
N03AF01 87.89 6.52 3.17 6.07 2.62 27.39 No 48 
N03AG01 97.71 14.94 8.59 12.67 6.31 2.55 No 40 
N03AX09 96.34 46.94 28.84 31.15 5.63 99.91 No 24 
N03AX11 94.73 49.72 32.56 44.25 15.76 99.68 No 12 
N03AX12 90.76 31.54 17.92 28.72 9.78 100 No 40 
N05AH02 31.21 20.50 13.11 18.38 6.22 100 No 48 
N05AX08 32.76 47.85 27.96 20.38 9.59 71.38 Yes 12 
N05BA01 27.13 3.41 1.00 4.45 0.70 99.30 No 48 
N05BA12 89.76 3.40 1.33 3.34 0.94 35.83 No 6 
N05CD02 25.80 1.27 0.30 1.52 0.25 97.02 No 48 
N05CF02 59.06 4.89 2.02 4.78 1.08 100 No 48 
N06AB03 32.58 6.13 4.05 5.51 1.74 100 Yes 48 
N06AB04 20.63 7.02 4.51 3.90 1.47 100 Yes 48 
N06AB05 30.76 6.32 3.61 4.34 1.41 100 Yes 46 
N06AB06 64.51 5.59 3.42 4.99 1.23 97.68 Yes 14 
N06AX03 90.89 4.89 2.18 6.01 2.76 100 Yes 48 
N06AX11 74.68 8.45 4.24 6.61 2.23 100 Yes 20 
N06BA04 39.82 7.02 3.69 21.68 14.13 77.18 No 48 
R05CB01 40.69 4.22 1.77 4.23 1.70 98.31 No 48 
R06AE07 26.69 2.48 1.09 1.62 0.48 98.76 Yes 48 
R06AX13 53.42 3.02 1.80 2.93 1.47 100 Yes 12 
S01ED51 63.01 7.09 4.61 8.81 5.92 78.96 No 48 
 
  
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1. Percentage margins and market shares, wholesaler 1 
 
 
Figure 2. Percentage margins and market shares, wholesaler 2 
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 Figure 3. Percentage margins and market shares, wholesaler 3 
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